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Intermezzo
The publication of the previous Chapter 3 (Wolf et al., 2007a) led to some scientific
discussion among researchers including the publication of two ‘Brief communica-
tions arising’ in Nature from colleagues of us, each of which followed up by a
brief reply from ourselves. I chose to reproduce both the original responses to our
paper and our replies to these responses. The chronologically second response
(Massol & Crochet, 2008; Wolf et al., 2008a) addresses an interesting technical point
concerning the emergence of polymorphisms. The chronologically first response
(McElreath et al., 2007; Wolf et al., 2007b) addresses the feedbacks between risky
action and future fitness expectations, an issue that we will be investigated in
depth in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
DO ANIMAL PERSONALITIES EMERGE?
F. Massol & P. Crochet Nature 451: E8–E9 (2008)
The evolution of animal personalities is a topic of primary importance in behav-
ioural ecology. An intriguing empirical fact is the consistency of animal responses
to repeated stresses or threats. Wolf et al. propose an evolutionary model to
explain the emergence of consistent personalities (Wolf et al., 2007a). They show
that a population dimorphism for an exploration trait implies the existence of
behavioural syndromes, such as decreased aggressiveness and the boldness of
‘thorough explorers’. This finding helps explain how animal responses can be
consistent, despite the seeming advantages of flexible responses. However, we
contend that the emergence of a dimorphism depends critically on the intensity of
the trade-off between exploration investment and first-year fecundity. 
Wolf et al. (2007a) introduced a model of temporal allocation to fecundity to
answer questions related to animal personalities. Their model is based on four
ingredients: individuals reproduce twice during their lives; two habitats are avail-
able (bad and good) and influence the fecundity of individuals (individuals in bad
habitats produce fewer offspring); all individuals first reproduce in a bad habitat;
individuals can trade off some of their fecundity during their first reproduction
event to find a better habitat to reproduce in the second year. Thus, ‘thorough
explorers’ bet on their second reproduction event, while ‘superficial explorers’
reproduce equally well at all opportunities. The authors prove that a population
dimorphism of the exploration trait influences the evolution of behavioural
responses in hawk–dove and predator–prey games. Without introducing any
constraints on responses to these games, they predict the emergence of two
extreme syndromes, with superficial explorers being consistently bold and aggres-
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sive and thorough explorers, shy and non-aggressive. These results encompass the
predictions of Bishop–Cannings’ theorem (Bishop & Cannings, 1976), which states
that strategies yielding stochastic responses cannot be evolutionarily stable. The
authors take a step further by showing the consistency of responses across differ-
ent games. 
Despite its interesting conclusions, this model has a weak point. The conclu-
sions of Wolf et al. are based on the existence of a population dimorphism of the
exploration strategy. Although the authors do prove that a dimorphic population


































































Figure I.1 Pairwise invasibility plots. These diagrams show which mutant strategies can
invade in an initially monomorphic situation. The x axis represents the initial exploring stra-
tegy (xresident), and the y axis, the mutant strategy (xmutant). White regions indicate cases
where the mutant can invade (+), while black regions (–) represent cases where an initially
rare mutant never invades. The solid arrows suggest possible evolutionary trajectories
under the assumption of small mutation effects. Dashed arrows indicate evolutionary bran-
ching after monomorphic evolution. Parameter values: in all panels α = 0.005, fh = 3.5 and
fl = 3.0 ; in (A) β = 1.25 (as in Wolf et al., 2007a); in (B) β = 1.6 ; in (C) β = 1.8 ; and in (D) β = 10.
is protected from further invasions, they leave unaddressed the issue of its emer-
gence. We looked at the fitness of a rare mutant in an initially monomorphic popu-
lation, as is classically done in adaptive dynamics studies (Hofbauer & Sigmund,
1990; Nowak & Sigmund, 1990; Dieckmann & Law, 1996; Geritz et al., 1998; Geritz
et al., 1999; Waxman & Gavrilets, 2005). A pairwise invasibility plot (Geritz et al.,
1998; Geritz et al., 1999; Waxman & Gavrilets, 2005) confirms that the parameter
set investigated by the authors (α = 0.005, fh = 3.5, fl = 3.0, β = 1.25) leads to a
dimorphism through a branching point (Figure I.1A). However, this result depends
critically on parameter β , which controls the trade-off between exploration invest-
ment and first-year fecundity: for higher β , pairwise invasibility plots display a
branching point, an evolutionary repellor and an evolutionarily stable strategy (β
= 1.6, Figure I.1B), two evolutionarily stable strategies and an evolutionary repel-
lor (β = 10, Figure I.1D) or only one evolutionarily stable strategy (β = 1.8, Figure
I.1C). These situations do not generically lead to a stable dimorphism. 
Proving that a dimorphic coalition is protected from invasions or that it
emerges through evolutionary branching are different tasks (Slatkin, 1980;
Maynard Smith, 1989; Dieckmann & Law, 1996). Wolf and colleagues’ proof deals
only with the former. We have shown that the emergence of a dimorphism
happens only under restricted conditions. The emergence of animal personalities
might thus be limited by extrinsic constraints, for example, the difficulty of both
rearing offspring and looking for a better habitat. Finally, branching points in
haploid models cannot be literally translated as the emergence of dimorphism in
diploid sexually reproducing organisms because recombination and the absence
of assortment or dominance can prevent the evolution of genotypic bimodality
(Waxman & Gavrilets, 2005).
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DO ANIMAL PERSONALITIES EMERGE? – REPLY
M. Wolf, G. S.van Doorn, O. Leimar & F. J. Weissing Nature 451: E9–E10 (2008)
The more an individual stands to lose, the more cautious it should be. In a recent
contribution (Wolf et al., 2007a) we have shown that this basic principle gives rise
to consistent individual differences in risk related behaviour whenever individu-
als differ in future fitness expectations. To illustrate this, we considered a model
where differences in fitness expectations result from a trade-off between current
and future reproduction. Massol and Crochet argue (Massol & Crochet, 2008) that
the emergence of such differences depends on the shape of this trade-off. This
claim is based on the technical argument that our model has a ‘branching point’
only for a limited range of the trade-off parameter β . In contrast, we show here
that the emergence of individual differences is a robust phenomenon that does not
depend on such details. Our analysis illustrates the important insight that a
branching point is not needed for the emergence of polymorphism.
In the Supplementary Information (Wolf et al., 2007a) to our paper we prove
that a dimorphic population consisting of the two extreme exploration strategies
x = 0 and x = 1 is stable. This is reflected by the fact that in all pairwise invasibility
plots for β > 1 (e.g., those shown in Massol & Crochet, 2008)a mutant with strategy
xm = 0 can invade in an x = 1 resident population, and vice versa. Yet it is not self-
evident that such a stable dimorphism is attainable from a monomorphic ancestral
state. According to adaptive dynamics theory (Geritz et al., 1998) a stable polymor-
phism will evolve in the presence of a branching point. Massol and Crochet
(2008)correctly argue that our model only has a branching point if the trade-off is
moderate (e.g., β = 1.25, Figure I.2A) but not if it is very strong (e.g., β = 2.0, Figure
I.2C). Nevertheless, our individual-based simulations (Wolf et al., 2007a) led us to
conclude that a dimorphism emerges for all β > 1. In other words, a dimorphism
can evolve in the presence (Figure I.2B, β = 1.25) but also in the absence of a
branching point (Figure I.2D, β = 2.0).
To substantiate this result we ran more than 1000 additional individual-based
simulations with varying initial conditions and varying β-values. To be specific,
100 β-values were randomly drawn from the uniform distribution on the interval
1 < β < 10. For each of these β-values we ran 11 simulations with initial x-values
between 0.0 and 1.0 in steps of 0.1. The mutation rate was µ = 1x10-5, and the
mutational step sizes were drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and
standard deviation 0.3. The outcome was unambiguous: the stable dimorphism of
the two extreme strategies x = 0 and x = 1 emerged in all these simulations, irre-
spective of the initial conditions and the value of β . 
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How can this seeming discrepancy with the adaptive dynamics approach be
explained? Adaptive dynamics analysis often makes two important assumptions
(Geritz et al., 1998), which may be considered a worst-case scenario for the emer-
gence of polymorphism. First, populations have a low level of diversity since the
resident population is only rarely challenged by mutants. Second, mutations have
small phenotypic effect. The scope of these assumptions has been debated (Barton
& Polechova, 2005; Dieckmann & Doebeli, 2005; Waxman & Gavrilets, 2005) and
neither of them is strictly satisfied in our individual-based simulations. First,
several mutants are typically present simultaneously, since new mutations often
occur before old ones are ousted from the population. Second, mutational effect
sizes are drawn from a normal distribution implying that mutations of large effect
are rare but sometimes occur. The consequence of these differences in assumptions
can be illustrated by the pairwise invasibility plot in Figure I.2C. When mutations
are very rare and have small effects one would predict (as Massol and Crochet do)
that evolution gives rise to the monomorphic population x = 1, which can be
considered an evolutionary trap. Yet, as can also be seen in this figure, a mutant
with a sufficiently deviant phenotype (xm < 0.83) can invade the population and
trigger the evolution to the stable dimorphism.
We think that the assumptions used in our individual-based simulations are
quite realistic. It is well known that natural populations tend to contain consider-
able amounts of standing genetic variation, and widely accepted approaches like
quantitative genetics  (Lynch & Walsh, 1998) are based on this fact. At present, the
distribution of mutational effect sizes is only known for a small number of empiri-
cal examples (Barton & Keightley, 2002; Eyre-Walker & Keightley, 2007). The
limited evidence available indicates that such distributions seem to have ‘fat tails,’
suggesting that mutations with larger effect sometimes occur. In fact, this is not
implausible. The Evo-Devo revolution (Carroll, 2005) has provided plenty of
examples where single mutations (e.g. in a regulatory pathway) have a huge
phenotypic effect. Traditionally it is assumed that such mutations can be neglected
since they generally result in disintegrated phenotypes with low fitness (Fisher,
1930). But this is not necessarily the case. Consider, for example, a switching
device that switches between two well integrated phenotypes (in our model:
superficial and thorough exploration). It is easily conceivable that a mutation that
has a large effect on the position of the switch (e.g., one that knocks out one of the
two phenotypes, thereby leading to the unconditional expression of the alternative
phenotype) gives rise to a high-fitness individual.
The issues raised by Massol and Crochet (2008) are interesting and important,
but they should be put into the proper perspective. Their critique does not touch
upon the main thrust of our theory, which is that individual differences in future
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reproductive value give rise to consistent individual differences in risk-related
behaviour. We worked out (Wolf et al., 2007a) one (potentially important) model
for the emergence of differences in future reproductive value, but we stressed that
there are more mechanisms and processes leading to such differences. In all these
cases, our theory predicts the emergence of personalities.








































































Figure I.2 Emergence of a polymorphism in the presence and in the absence of a branching
point. Pairwise invisibility plots are shown together with corresponding individual-based
simulation results for two values of the trade-off parameter β. In (A) and (B), β = 1.25, the
standard parameter setting used in (Wolf et al., 2007a); in (C) and (D), β = 2.0. The white
regions (+) in the pairwise invasibility plots correspond to mutant strategies that can invade
a given resident population, while dark grey regions (–) indicate mutants that cannot
invade. According to adaptive dynamics theory (Geritz et al., 1998), configuration (A) is a
branching point leading to the emergence of a polymorphism. In (C), there is a single evolu-
tionary attractor at x = 1, and a branching point does not exist. Despite of these differences, a
dimorphism evolves in the individual-based simulations for both scenarios. In scenarios
without a branching point (such as C) this happens whenever mutational step sizes are not
too small. Here the mutation rate was µ = 3x10-4 and mutational step sizes were drawn from
a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation.
EVOLUTION OF ANIMAL PERSONALITIES?
R. McElreath, B. Luttbeg, S.P. Fogarty, T. Brodin & A. Sih Nature 450: E5 (2007)
Wolf et al. (2007a) propose a model to explain the existence of animal personalities,
consistent with behavioural differences among individuals in various contexts
(Gosling, 2001; Sih et al., 2004a; Sih et al., 2004b) —their explanation is counter-
intuitive and cogent. However, all models have their limits, and the particular life-
history requirements of this one may be unclear. Here we analyse their model and
clarify its organismal scope. 
Under some conditions, Wolf et al. (2007a) find consistent behavioural differ-
ences between individuals that reproduce early in life and those that delay repro-
duction to explore their habitats instead to enhance future reproduction.
Non-explorers that reproduce early in life later become bold and aggressive,
whereas exploratory individuals with greater future reproductive potential are
shy and unaggressive. These differences are caused by asset protection (Clark,
1994) where individuals with greater future fitness take fewer risks that would
jeopardize that fitness. 
Asset protection, however, is a negative feedback process that, given time,
makes individuals more alike, not less. In Clark’s original asset protection paper
(Clark, 1994), many decisions are made over an animal’s lifespan. Over time, indi-
viduals tend towards similar behaviour, despite any initial differences in assets,
because those with assets take few risks and acquire little new fitness. Those with-
out high assets take more risks and (unless they die trying) acquire new fitness
assets that become worth protecting. 
If, in the model of Wolf et al., individuals experience many hawk-dove encoun-
ters, successful hawks would eventually accumulate enough fitness for playing
dove to become their optimal behaviour. Given time to accrue new assets, behav-
ioural types would converge. Two particular conditions that could prevent this
convergence are: animals with very short lives might not have time to change
their assets sufficiently to cause changes in behaviour; and early life-history
choices can have such large fitness consequences that subsequent bold and aggres-
sive behaviour has relatively little influence on assets. Notably, these conditions
do not seem to fit the maintenance of stable personalities in long-lived organisms
such as humans. 
The model of Wolf et al. requires bold/aggressive contexts not to dominate one
another in fitness consequences, otherwise the negative feedback of asset protec-
tion will apply at this smaller scale (Supplementary Fig. A2 of Wolf et al., 2007a: in
the square in which behavioural correlations could evolve, there is a wedge-
shaped region without correlation between the hawk–dove and predator games).
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We reproduced their model and found that, in this region, thorough explorers are
less aggressive than non-explorers, but no one is bold. Without the hawk-dove
game, explorers would be shy and non-explorers bold, but when the hawk-dove
game has sufficiently higher fitness consequences than the boldness game, all
individuals are shy to eliminate the risk of dying before the fitness windfall from
the hawk-dove game. This is the asset-protection principle, working on the scale
of the low-fitness behavioural contexts, producing behavioural inconsistency,
unless the contexts do not dominate one another. 
An alternative way of explaining behavioural consistency and correlations is
through positive (not negative) feedback. For example, if thorough explorers gain
assets (energy, size, knowledge) that improve their abilities to escape predators or
to win fights, then we might find positive correlations between exploration, bold-
ness and aggressiveness. Additional behaviour would positively feed back on
state, maintaining differences in assets and behavioural types. What is needed
next is a unified modelling framework in which both negative and positive state
feedback, as well as other mechanisms, can be compared.
EVOLUTION OF ANIMAL PERSONALITIES? – REPLY
M. Wolf, G. S.van Doorn, O. Leimar & F. J. Weissing Nature 450: E5–E6 (2007)
The evolution of animal personalities is still poorly understood. The emergence of
consistent individual differences is relatively easy to envisage when initial differ-
ences in behaviour are reinforced by positive feedback mechanisms. Such rein-
forcement might act through learning or training, or through behaviour-induced
changes in an individual’s condition (Rands et al., 2003) or environment
(Hemelrijk & Wantia, 2005). However, positive feedback is not required. We
showed that, even without such feedback, differences in fitness expectations result
in consistent differences in risk-taking behaviour (Wolf et al., 2007a). This was
illustrated by a model that, for simplicity, considers a short life history. McElreath
et al. (2007) argue that our results extend to long-lived organisms only under
specific conditions. Although we agree that the full scope and limitations of our
model still have to be mapped out, we believe that our arguments are also rele-
vant to long-lived organisms. 
Our theory is based on the principle of asset protection (Clark, 1994): the more
an individual stands to lose, the more cautiously it should behave. McElreath et al.
(2007) argue that asset protection entails a negative feedback that tends to erode
individual differences. This may indeed be the case if large assets can be accumu-
lated by risky behaviour: risk-proneness while accumulating assets would then be
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followed by risk-aversion while protecting the acquired assets. However, the
analysis of McElreath et al. is incomplete for at least two reasons. 
First, not all payoffs should be considered as assets. Payoffs can be either spent
immediately in current reproduction or invested into future reproductive poten-
tial. Only the latter, resulting in an increase in future reproductive value (Williams,
1966), corresponds to assets. Consequently, when the payoffs of risky games only
affect immediate reproduction, no asset accumulation takes place and there is no
negative feedback eroding individual differences. There might even be positive
feedbacks, enhancing individual differences, if risky payoffs tend to be immediate
whereas non-risky payoffs tend to increase the future reproductive value. 
Second, McElreath et al. extrapolate our model to long-lived organisms in a
one-sided manner. They assume that differences in assets due to life-history deci-
sions only occur once in an individual’s lifetime whereas the number and impor-
tance of risky games increases with life expectancy. There are certainly examples
where an individual’s fate is governed by a single life-history switch. Yet, such
‘career decisions’ (Ens et al., 1995) are typically associated with long-lasting fitness
consequences that are not eroded by everyday risky behaviour. More commonly,
however, life-history decisions (such as thorough or superficial exploration) have
to be taken repeatedly throughout an individual’s life. As a consequence, assets
are not only eroded but can also be built up. 
In conclusion, the potential of negative feedback to erode individual differ-
ences is substantially smaller than McElreath et al. suggest. We therefore maintain
that asset protection furthers the understanding of animal personalities in both
short-and long-lived organisms. Yet, there are certainly situations in which nega-
tive feedbacks as described by McElreath et al. are important. In such situations, a
switch might occur from a risk-prone to a risk-averse personality. Indeed, person-
alities are not always stable from the cradle to the grave. Take our own species,
where young individuals with a risky lifestyle become more cautious later in life
(when assets are at stake). Similarly, hover wasps switch from risk-prone to risk-
averse behaviour once they are close enough to the breeding position (Field et al.,
2006). Our theory accounts for such switches associated with asset accumulation
and it produces testable predictions for their occurrence. Hence, even in the pres-
ence of negative feedbacks, the principle of asset protection is crucial for under-
standing animal personalities.
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